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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between inequality and happiness through the 
lens of heterogeneous values, beliefs and inclinations. Drawing upon opinion data from the 
European Social Survey for twenty-three countries, we find that individual views on a wide 
range of themes can be effectively summarized by two orthogonal dimensions: moderation 
and inclusiveness. The former is defined as a tendency to take mild stands on issues rather 
than extreme ones; the latter is defined as the degree of support for a social model that grants 
equal rights to everyone who willingly subscribes to a shared set of rules, regardless of 
background and circumstances. These traits matter when it comes to how inequality affects 
subjective well-being; specifically, those who are either more moderate or more inclusive 
than their average compatriots prefer lower levels of inequality. In the case of moderation, 
inequality aversion can be read in terms of a desire for stability: people who are reluctant to 
take strong stands are especially wary of conflict, tension and unrest, which often go hand-
in-hand with disparities. In the case of inclusiveness, the main element at play is likely to be 
distress accruing on a perception of unfairness.  
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* Bank of Italy, Economic and Financial Statistics Department. 1 Introduction
Is inequality desirable or undesirable? Does it have an eect on well-being,
and is this eect uniform across countries and people? These are very im-
portant research questions, if only on account of the political relevance of
debates on redistribution.
Dierent disciplines provide dierent answers. Economists generally seek
to qualify inequality according to its eect on indicators of material welfare,
such as the growth rate of GDP per capita; so far, results have been mixed
[Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Bertola, 1999; Forbes, 2000; Keefer and Knack,
2002; Quah, 2003; Banerjee and Du
o, 2003]. Moral philosophers and social
choice scholars, on the other hand, tend to evaluate income distributions
based on their compliance with a theory of justice, again with varied con-
clusions [Rawls, 1971; Dworkin, 1981; Cohen, 1989; Lefranc, Pistolesi and
Trannoy, 2006]. The two camps overlap only occasionally; when they do,
discussions arise over the relative importance that should be attributed to
economic performance and ethical concerns [World Bank, 2005; Roemer,
2006].
In recent years, a new perspective has emerged. Data on subjective
well-being or `happiness', once used almost exclusively in psychology, have
gained credibility among economists in the wake of the success enjoyed by
behavioural studies, and of improved techniques for the measurement of
subjective states [Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Kahneman and Kruger, 2006; Di
Tella and McCulloch, 2006]. Researchers can now ascertain how people
feel about inequality and why, as a useful complement to asking whether a
distributive rule is good or bad in the light of a general principle.
The happiness perspective appears to oer a major advantage in the
analysis of a political and emotional wedge issue such as inequality: it is
intrinsically focused on heterogeneity. Dierent individuals have been found
to map the same events of life into happiness levels in a dierent way, de-
pending on circumstances, attitudes, beliefs, and a host of other factors
[Rojas, 2007]1. In a sense, happines studies are naturally positioned at the
1For example, Frey and Stutzer [2005] show that a worker's ethnic background is im-
portant in determining how workplace policies in favour of racial integration aect their
happiness. Becchetti, Castriota and Giuntella [2006] use data on subjective well-being
to estimate how the trade-o between in
ation and unemployment diers across social
groups, following the idea of community group indierence maps originally provided by
Chossudovsky [1972]. McFarlin and Rice [1992] prove that subjective facet importance is
3nal stage of the debate, already incorporating the idea that the ordering
of distributions is better left to politics, at least until the weight assigned to
notions such as equity or eciency varies across the population.
This paper brings together in a simple model suggestions from dier-
ent strands of thought. We hypothesize that inequality exerts an eect on
subjective well-being, and focus on the role of personal values as a lter
between the two. Looking at survey data for more than 32,000 individu-
als in twenty-three European countries, we perform multivariate analysis on
eighteen statements related to diverse moral issues, and extrapolate two or-
thogonal dimensions: moderation, dened as a tendency to take mild stands
on issues rather than extreme ones, and inclusiveness, dened as support
for a social model that grants equal rights to everyone who willingly sub-
scribes to a shared set of rules, regardless of background and circumstances.
When regressing happiness on the interaction between values and distribu-
tive indicators, we nd that individuals who are either more moderate or
more inclusive than their representative compatriots prefer lower levels of
inequality. In the case of moderation, we read this result in terms of a desire
for stability: people who are reluctant to take strong stands are especially
wary of con
ict, tension and unrest, frequent companions to disparities. In
the case of inclusiveness, the main element at play is likely to be distress
accruing on a perception of unfairness.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the
literature on inequality and happiness. Section 3 introduces our model.
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6
concludes. The Appendix contains further tables.
2 The literature
Many papers have been written on the relationship between inequality and
happiness, usually incorporating the idea that the connection is strongly
subjective in nature. The individual lter has been analysed from a number
of angles.
The approach closest to the one we propose here singles out the role
played by interpretation: happiness is not in
uenced by the distribution of
a non-negligible factor in determining overall levels of job satisfaction. Kohler, Behrman
and Skytthe [2005] nd that the impact of parenthood on happiness can be dierent for
mothers and fathers.
4income per se, but rather by the social ordering observers read into it. Most
authors highlight the relevance of cultural elements in shaping the inter-
pretation process, thus falling into step with the growing literature devoted
to how collective beliefs aect economic behaviours and outcomes [Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales, 2003; Tabellini, 2006; F ernandez and Fogli, 2006;
Horii, Jin and Levitt, 2005].
Graham and Felton [2006] nd that in Latin America the correlation
between Gini coecients and happiness is strongly negative, since most peo-
ple perceive it as an indicator of persistent social rifts and poverty traps.
Alesina, Di Tella and McCulloch [2004] analyse the dierences between
North America and Europe, also taking into account heterogeneity in so-
cial class and political positioning. They conclude that the American poor
do not dislike inequality, because they believe that adequate eort will save
them; the American rich who dene themselves as left-leaning do, because
they nd it unfair, and possibly because they are afraid of losing their place.
In Europe, on the contrary, aversion to inequality is found chie
y among the
poor, who feel stuck in their situation independent of political orientation.
While not directly tackling subjective well-being, B enabou and Tirole [2006]
present similar insights in their work on beliefs and redistributive policies:
North Americans mostly see poverty as an indicator of laziness, and inequal-
ity as a signal of mobility, while Europeans tend to believe that the poor
are mainly unlucky, and associate inequality with unearned fortunes.
Another popular point of view in the study of inequality and happiness is
the positional one: people do not like to see inequality because it makes them
feel bad about their own circumstances relative to others. The relatively
poor resent their economic inferiority (envy), and the relatively rich resent
their enjoyment of privileges that others do not have access to (guilt). In
their seminal paper on cooperative behaviour in games, Fehr and Schmidt
[1999] term the combination of these feelings `self-centred inequity aversion'.
The theme of envy has illustrious precedents: the idea that upward
comparison leads to dissatisfaction dates as far back as Veblen [1899], and
was greatly expanded upon by Easterlin [1974] and Hirsch [1976] in their
studies on adaptive expectations and status signalling. If we assume that
individual desire for consumption is in
uenced by social standards, then the
comparison with others becomes, to a certain extent, also a comparison with
one's own aspirations; psychology oers a class of `have-want' models for the
5analysis of this phenomenon, recently adopted by economists interested in
happiness [Stutzer, 2004; Easterlin, 2006]. Clark and Oswald [1996] nd
that the self-reported satisfaction of British workers is negatively related
to their benchmark wage, i.e. the average wage earned by workers with the
same qualications and experience; Luttmer [2005] has similar results for the
United States.2 As for the role of guilt as an engine of inequality aversion
on the part of the rich, results in behavioral economics appear to prove
that downward comparison might curb happiness because of various factors,
including but not limited to feelings of altruism, a yearning for justice, fear
that a privileged place in society can make one the target of resentment and
violence, and even an interest in allocative eciency [Homan, McCabe and
Smith, 1996; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Henrich et al, 2004].
In this paper, we take into account both interpretation processes and
positional concerns. Although the two have already been considered together
in experiments based on modied Ultimatum Games [Homan, McCabe,
Shachat, and Smith, 1994], to our knowledge there is only one work that does
so in the context of the relationship between inequality and happiness: Clark
[2003] estimates the eects of both relative income and absolute inequality
in Britain, nding that happiness is increasing in both (people probably
approve of competing, but disapprove of losing).
Moreover, while the importance of beliefs has been singled out in the
past, our contribution appears to be the rst that articulates the relation-
ship between a wide array of core moral values and feelings on inequality
at the individual level. The micro-level perspective, while common in soci-
ology [Inglehart and Baker, 2000], so far has not been used frequently by
economists, who prefer to typify individuals based on exogenous partitions
that function as proxies for inherited culture and customs: religious denom-
ination, nationality, ethnicity. There are valid reasons for this choice: most
importantly, the set of priors and preferences accruing to a certain type of
religious doctrine or to a certain national community has been shown to be
so slow-moving that reverse causation from almost any dependent variable
to those features can be ruled out, at least in the short run. We try si-
multaneously to preserve the high degree of freedom and detail allowed by
2There are even indications that this type of feeling might not be exclusive to humans,
as the experiments on monkeys conducted by Brosnan and de Waal [2003] show: capuchin
monkeys trained to exchange rock tokens for food react badly whenever they perceive that
they are being shortchanged compared with their peers.
6micro-level analysis and to avoid the problems of causality by limiting our
study to beliefs and preferences that appear to be set deep in the psycho-
logical makeup of individuals or in their upbringing, and should therefore
not be in
uenced by the level of happiness experienced in a given period.
3 The model
The model we propose integrates the suggestions of the literature discussed
above with a systematic attempt to formalise the precise nature of the pro-
cess through which agents lter perceptions of inequality into feelings of
happiness.
The idea is as follows. Individuals look at the whole distribution of in-
comes in order to determine their well-being; in particular, they take into
consideration, besides their own income, one or more measures of position,
and one or more measures of dispersion. The former constitute a refer-
ence point for the determination of one's social status, while the latter are
read as a description of the social ordering and its degree of persistence.
Distributive features are then ltered into happiness on the basis of incli-
nations, beliefs and values, dened respectively as innate character traits,
priors about how the world actually works, and preferences about how it
should work [Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006]. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we will refer to these three concepts with the sole term 'values' in the
following. In particular, we want to see whether heterogeneity in personal
values implies heterogeneity in the links between inequality and happiness.
The idea can be formalized as follows:
Hi = h(g(fi(x);vi);qi) (1)
where Hi is the happiness level for agent i and h is the technology of hap-
piness production. The function g describes how vi, the vector of personal
values for individual i, interacts with the perceived density function of in-
come fi(x) in order to produce a judgement on distributive matters. Finally,
qi is a vector of known determinants of happiness, such as health and marital
status.
From (1) we derive the following equation for estimation purposes:
H = [S   Sc]0[Y Yr Yc Gr] + 
Q + " (2)
7where H is the vector of self-reported happiness levels; [S Sc] is a ma-
trix of synthetical indicators of personal values, resulting from multivariate
analysis of elementary value items and expressed as deviations from national
medians; Y, Yr, Yc and Gr are respectively the vectors of personal incomes,
median incomes in the respondent's region and country, and standardized
interquartile ranges for incomes in the respondent's region. Finally, Q is a
matrix of controls.
We choose to estimate a few synthetical indicators from a large array of
elementary value items, rather than directly picking a group of values small
enough to generate an economical specication of the regression. We want
to eschew self-fullling intuitive priors, such as the idea that a favourable
disposition to solidarity matters more than, say, the level of trust towards
others in determining what kind of income distribution a person desires.
Values are expressed in terms of deviations from the national median be-
cause we know, from results in public choice theory rst derived by Meltzer
and Richard [1981] and subsequently rened, that the distribution of in-
come is in
uenced by the institutional and political features of a country.
Those, in turn, can be held to re
ect prevailing preferences through electoral
mechanisms, a particularly relevant aspect for a sample consisting entirely
of democratic countries. While the derivation of a voting model is beyond
the goal of this paper, we need to neutralize potential endogeneity problems
arising from the correlation between mainstream opinions and observed in-
equality levels; looking at relative rather than absolute values appears to
be the most natural solution. In doing so, we also follow the insight oered
by psychologists Sagiv and Schwartz [2000], according to whom `well-being
[also] depends upon congruence between personal values and the prevail-
ing value environment'. Our reference unit for calculating deviations is the
country because, to the best of our knowledge, the large majority of welfare
policies in the area we consider are decided at the national level.
Where income is concerned, we use positional and distributive indicators
at the regional level instead, so as to better represent the idea of perceived
income distribution expressed in (1). We follow an insight that is present
throughout the literature reviewed in Section 2: people are imperfectly in-
formed about the income of others, and in general the knowledge that person
A has about the standard of living of person B is inversely proportional to
the geographical distance between the two, both because of direct exposure
8and the impact of local news media. This idea is incorporated in our model
by assuming that people derive their distributive facts from short-range in-
formation only.3 We add the national median of incomes as a proxy of the
quality of public goods and the general standards of living.
4 The data
The empirical analysis is based on data from the second round of the Eu-
ropean Social Survey, carried out in 2004. The Survey, funded by the
European Commission, the European Science Foundation and several na-
tional partners, `has been mapping long-term attitudinal and behavioural
changes in Europe's social, political and moral climate' since 2001 [www.
europeansocialsurvey.org, 2007]. It is directed by an international Cen-
tral Co-ordinating Team based in London, and carried out every two years
by independent national teams; a single questionnaire is created in English,
then translated into several languages. Contrary to other surveys of a simi-
lar nature, the sampling design is entirely probabilistic. In countries where
lists of households are available, the sampling unit is the household; other-
wise, the sampling unit is the street address, then a household living at that
address is chosen at random. In both cases, the nal respondent is an adult
chosen at random among the members of the household.
Each round has a core module covering twelve broad topics, ranging
from demographics and nancial circumstances to political engagement and
subjective well-being. Several rotating modules, which vary from round to
round, complement the core module. We focus on the second round only,
disregarding the rst, not only because it covers a larger number of countries,
3This strategy ignores the suggestion provided by public choice theory according to
which perceptions such as the one we are studying should be reconstructed based both on
where an agent lives and on their degree of interest in the phenomenon at hand: someone
who follows economic news closely might have a precise idea of the national and even
international distribution of income, while someone who is uninterested in the matter
might have a knowledge that is limited to the immediate neighbourhood. The hypothesis
has been proven correct in several occasions, but we cannot employ it in our empirical
work for two reasons. Even if we were able to identify groups with dierent informational
scopes, which may be possible in the light of available data, the sample size would not
allow us to estimate inequality at the appropriate level for the less informed, say town or
district. Also, we would need assumptions concerning not only the relationship between
the self-reported degree of information and the scope of knowledge about incomes, but also
the distribution of the error term, which would probably be both higher and more variable
for the less informed. These two processes appear to introduce a degree of arbitrariness
that osets the gains.
9but also because it oers a rotating module on economic morality, which
helps to ascertain individual attitudes towards a wide range of economic
behaviours. At the time of writing this paper, data for twenty-six countries
had been released to the public; we included twenty-three.4 Most national
samples comprise between 1,500 and 2,500 observations, for a total of 43,650,
and all come with design weights for national estimates. For Europe-wide
estimates, population weights are provided that correct for the imbalance in
sampling fractions.
Item non-response is a serious problem in the ESS; data on income and on
personal values, both of which are essential for our model, are particularly
aected. We tried to balance quality and quantity through a mixture of
model-based imputation, variable selection and data deletion, as discussed
in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. The nal sample includes 35,335 observations, or
80.95 per cent of the original ESS sample (Tables 1 and A.1), with national
samples ranging from 507 households for Iceland to 2,370 households for
Germany.









Austria 1,602 0.197 Luxembourg 1,295 2.868
Belgium 1,636 0.157 Netherlands 1,745 0.107
Czech Republic 1,781 0.174 Norway 1,710 0.374
Denmark 1,248 0.231 Poland 1,307 0.034
Estonia 1,289 0.954 Portugal 1,626 0.155
Finland 1,887 0.362 Slovakia 1,022 0.190
France 1,404 0.023 Slovenia 1,152 0.577
Germany 2,430 0.029 Spain 1,321 0.031
Greece 2,048 0.185 Sweden 1,754 0.195
Hungary 1,153 0.114 Switzerland 1,860 0.253
Iceland 507 1.745 United Kingdom 1,755 0.029
Ireland 1,803 0.448 Total 35,335 0.087
+Sampling fractions are computed based on population statistics for 1.1.2004, as provided
by Eurostat in Population and Social Conditions, 2005/15.
The ESS questionnaire can be found on the Web, along with method-
ological documentation. In the following, we skip a detailed discussion of
variables that were merely taken in their original state and inserted in our
estimates as controls; instead, we focus on the treatment of income variables,
4Italy, Turkey and Ukraine were excluded on account of heavy item non-response for
questions related to values and beliefs.
10and on the choice of indicators for beliefs and values.
4.1 Income variables
The ESS questionnaire features the following item:
[I]f you add up the income from all sources, which letter describes
your household's total net income? If you don't know the exact
gure, please give an estimate.
Respondents are shown a card listing twelve brackets of weekly income,
each labelled with a dierent letter; the scale is also converted to monthly
and yearly equivalents for the sake of clarity. The brackets are of unequal
size, smaller at the bottom and larger at the top; the extreme ones are open-
ended, respectively including any income below 40 euros per week and any
income above 2,310 euros per week.
The item non-response rate for this question totals 19.61 per cent of the
nal sample and is unevenly distributed across countries: in Norway and
Sweden it is below 3 per cent, while in Portugal and Greece it exceeds 30
per cent. Since the willingness to provide income information is very likely
to be correlated with culture and values, as suggested on an intuitive level
by the geographical distribution of response rates, the mere elimination of
observations with missing values would probably introduce selection bias
and distort the results of subsequent analyses.
For each country, we estimate a simple logistic regression linking income
class with household size and with the answer to the following question:
Which of the[se] descriptions comes closest to how you feel about
your household's income nowadays: living comfortably on present
income, coping on present income, nding it dicult on present
income, or nding it very dicult on present income?
The model turns out to have good explanatory power for all countries,
with the share of concordant observation-prediction pairs ranging from 68.2
to 87.0 per cent depending on the country. We therefore employ it to impute
missing values: the resulting distribution is close to the original one (Table
2).
Even after taking care of missing data we still are left with income classes,
not income levels: the only information available on those is limited to the
11Table 2: Count and distribution of income classes
Class









1 96 409 505 1.39 1.44 1.43
2 331 1,394 1,725 4.78 4.91 4.88
3 608 2,176 2,784 8.77 7.66 7.88
4 1,185 4,068 5,253 17.10 14.32 14.87
5 919 4,033 4,952 13.26 14.20 14.01
6 804 3,255 4,059 11.60 11.46 11.49
7 645 2,772 3,417 9.31 9.76 9.67
8 678 2,799 3,477 9.78 9.85 9.84
9 980 4,540 5,520 14.14 15.98 15.62
10 406 1,941 2,347 5.86 6.83 6.64
11 147 605 752 2.12 2.13 2.13
12 132 412 544 1.90 1.45 1.54
Sample total 6,931 28,404 35,335 100.00 100.00 100.00
Row frequencies - - - 19.62 80.38 100.00
ve per cent of the original sample who answered a question on the in-
dividual net pay of the respondent alone for his or her main occupation.
However, classes are not adequate for the estimation of position and dis-
persion measures, and neither are simple imputation procedures based on
random draws from uniform distributions within the classes. First, the dis-
tribution of income is generally log-normal, implying that the distribution
within classes is skewed to the left for low incomes and to the right for high
incomes; the assumption of uniformity results in (probably asymmetrical)
overestimation of the weight on distribution tails, yielding in turn unpre-
dictable eects on inequality measures. Also, we need to take demographic
structure into account, especially because our sample includes both West-
ern and Eastern European countries; if, say, larger households are routinely
closer to the upper bound of their income class than smaller households,
neglecting household size and composition will lead to underestimation of
incomes in countries with higher fertility rates.
In order to take these important issues into account, we undertake a
further imputation step based on stratied density estimation. For each
country and for each household size a Gaussian kernel of the whole distribu-
tion is estimated; the resulting density is then normalized within each class,
so that household incomes can be drawn at random. In order to perform this
operation in the extreme classes, we apply bottom-coding and top-coding:
12the lowest bracket is closed at null income and the upper bracket is closed
at 150,000 euros.5Amounts thus obtained are equivalized with the modied
OECD equivalence scale. The weighted mean, median and standardized
interquartile range for the distribution of equivalent incomes are then com-
puted both at the national level and separately for each region, following the
EU-NUTS2 partition where the data allows, and the EU-NUTS1 partition
otherwise.
4.2 Values
The ESS oers hundreds of value-related questions, but most of them are
only answered by a share of the sample. We need to select a subset of
variables that strike a reasonable balance between the richness of individual
information and the availability of valid observations. Once this goal is
attained, a small number of synthetic indicators must be produced so as to
provide convenient input for regression analysis.
We go about the rst task by classifying available information on beliefs
and values into six broad thematic categories: trust, solidarity, legality, civic
engagement, the family, and diversity. Within each domain, the three vari-
ables with the lowest incidence of item non-response are chosen, for a total
of eighteen variables (Table A.2). The eighteen items are then subjected
to multiple correspondence analysis, a form of multivariate analysis suitable
for qualitative data. This technique is essentially a version of principal com-
ponent analysis based on the chi-square metric rather than on the euclidean
metric; for details see Benz ecri [1973] and Lebart, Morineau and Warwick
[1984]. In layman's terms, we study how opinions expressed by individu-
als on a large set of topics combine along a limited number of orthogonal
dimensions called factors, which are entirely endogenous to the data, and
should serve as a way of summarizing and interpreting them.
The estimation of multiple correspondences yields a reasonably good
t, with the rst two factors explaining 79.4 per cent of the total variance
generated by the eighteen individual variables (Table 3). Factor loadings
are reported in Table A.3, complete with relevant t statistics.
Factor 1 explains 48.9 per cent of total variance. For the question `Gen-
5Dierent choices, including the use of country-specic brackets and alternative kernel
functions, have been subjected to testing and do not appear to exert any considerable
in
uence on the nal estimates.













1 0.16374 0.01312 48.88 48.88 ************************
2 0.14101 0.00819 30.5 79.38 ***************
3 0.09443 0.00169 6.31 85.69 ***
4 0.08447 0.00094 3.49 89.18 **
5 0.08029 0.00069 2.56 91.74 *
6 0.07641 0.00049 1.82 93.55 *
7 0.07391 0.00038 1.41 94.96 *
8 0.07245 0.00032 1.19 96.15 *
9 0.07198 0.00030 1.13 97.28 *
+Only factors that explain one per cent or more of global variance are included in the table.
erally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can't be too careful?', for which an 11-point response scale is oered
where 0 means `You can't be too careful' and 10 means `Most people can be
trusted', positive factor loadings are estimated on scores of 4 to 9; they are
highest for scores of 6 and 7. Negative loadings appear for very low scores
and for the top score (Figure 1). For the question `When jobs are scarce,
men should have more right to a job than women', positive loadings are
observed for `Agree', `Neither agree nor disagree', and `Disagree', with the
latter option also being the one with the highest estimate; negative loadings
are found for `Strongly agree' and `Strongly disagree'. In the case of `How
wrong is it for someone to sell something second-hand and conceal some or
all of its faults?', positive loadings again apply for the intermediate response
options `A bit wrong' and `Wrong', while `Not wrong at all' and `Seriously
wrong' are associated with negative estimates. A similar U-shaped prole
for loadings emerges for the ve-point agreement scale proposed for `Society
would be better o if everyone just looked after themselves', for the four
possible answers to `To what extent do you think your country should allow
people of a dierent race to come and live here?', and for nearly all other
questions.
The picture painted by the analysis of loadings suggests that Factor 1
can be tentatively interpreted as an indicator of moderation, dened as the
tendency to express mild opinions rather than extreme ones: individuals who
score high on this factor are more likely to report agreement, disagreement
or (less frequently) lack of opinion with respect to any given statement
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Generally speaking, would you say most people 
can be trusted, or you can’t be too careful?
Most people can 
be trusted (10)



















than to express strong agreement or strong disagreement. The inclination
towards moderation measured by the factor turns out to be independent
of the specic beliefs held: negative loadings are consistently estimated for
extreme values of the agreement scale on items as dierent as `A woman
should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family'
and `Gay men and lesbians should be free to live as they wish'.
Factor 2 explains 30.5 per cent of total variance. Positive factor loadings
are associated with high levels of trust (score from 6 or above), disagreement
or strong disagreement with a men-rst policy in the job market, thorough
condemnation of fraud, disagreement or strong disagreement with the idea
that society would be better if everyone looked after themselves, and open-
ness towards immigrants of dierent races. Individuals who score high on
this axis also believe that citizens should spend some of their free time help-
ing others, state that they are not afraid of being treated dishonestly, appear
supportive of gender equality from a number of perspectives, and actively
participate in politics.
The joint consideration of these elements hints at a possible interpre-
tation of Factor 2 in terms of inclusiveness, dened as support for the ex-
tension of rights and opportunities to everyone, regardless of background
and circumstances. There is also an element of social cohesion based on the
consistent subscription to a shared set of rules.











































Figure 2 represents country medians on the two factor axes. Scandi-
navia scores high on both moderation and inclusiveness, while Mediter-
ranean countries and Eastern European ones are located in the opposite
quadrant. Central European and Anglophone countries display positive
scores for moderation, and hover around the mean with respect to inclu-
siveness.
The analysis of the correlation matrix between factor scores and other
individual traits reveals that associations between values, demographics and
social class are weak, with the Pearson correlation coecient reaching a
maximum of 0.39 in the case of inclusiveness and the number of years spent
in formal education. Age seems to have no correlation with moderation (-
0.07) and a slightly negative correlation (-0.14) with inclusiveness. Income
also feebly correlates with both (0.12 and 0.23 respectively).6
5 Results
We want to test whether heterogeneity in values, as summarized in our
two-factor representation, also implies heterogeneity in the links between
6In the case of income, correlations are bound to be articially weakened by the impu-
tation process. When computed on just raw data, however, the coecients change only
slightly.
16inequality and happiness. To this end, we run a set of ordered logits where
the degree of happiness in a scale ranging from 0 to 10 appears on the left-
hand side, while a number of variables related to the distribution of income
at the regional level appear on the right-hand side, both in raw form and
interacted with deviations from national medians in terms of moderation
and inclusiveness. These core variables are supplemented by a large number
of controls that are routinely used in happiness regressions.
Table 4 presents our results. When estimating the specication in (2),
the regression coecient for our indicator of inequality amounts to 0.24,
and after correction of standard errors for clustering at the regional level
it is barely signicant at the 10 per cent level. However, the interaction
between the same indicator and individual deviation in moderation from the
national median has a coecient of -1.27, signicant at the 1 per cent level;
the interaction between inequality and individual deviation in inclusiveness
from the national median has a coecient of -0.63 and is signicant at the
5 per cent level.7
Table 4: Ordered logit estimates for happiness
Estimate Std Err+ Pr>ChiSq
Equivalent income
Log own 0.144 0.024 0.000
*Moderation (deviation from median) -0.081 0.070 0.248
*Inclusiveness (deviation from median) -0.160 0.073 0.028
Std interquartile range, regional 0.248 0.150 0.098
*Moderation -1.272 0.282 0.000
*Inclusiveness -0.627 0.307 0.041
Log median, national 0.466 0.171 0.006
*Moderation -0.026 0.252 0.917
*Inclusiveness -0.469 0.330 0.156
Log median, regional -0.105 0.165 0.525
*Moderation -0.201 0.253 0.426
*Inclusiveness 0.225 0.349 0.520
Demographics
Gender: female 0.115 0.038 0.002
Age -0.066 0.009 0.000
Age squared 0.001 0.000 0.000
Self-reported health (baseline = very good)
Good -0.578 0.053 0.000
Fair -1.062 0.075 0.000
Bad -1.756 0.114 0.000
Very bad -2.447 0.334 0.000
Marital status (baseline = married or in registered cohabitation)
7Table A.4 in the Appendix shows that when values are not considered the eect of
inequality on happiness is not signicant.
17Table 4: Ordered logit estimates for happiness (continued)
Estimate Std Err+ Pr>ChiSq
Separated -0.964 0.148 0.000
Divorced -0.635 0.073 0.000
Widowed -0.927 0.076 0.000
Never married -0.647 0.049 0.000
Children
Children living at home -0.058 0.049 0.233
Children living outside the home 0.146 0.051 0.004
Social ties
At least one close friend 0.588 0.080 0.000
Frequency of social activity 0.157 0.017 0.000
Location (baseline = city center)
Suburbs or outskirts of big city -0.004 0.072 0.957
Town or small city 0.065 0.062 0.291
Country village 0.125 0.063 0.047
Farm or home in countryside 0.288 0.108 0.008
Feeling of safety in own neighbourhood (baseline = very safe)
Safe -0.084 0.043 0.053
Unsafe -0.180 0.061 0.003
Very unsafe -0.332 0.115 0.004
Job status (baseline = employee)
Student 0.060 0.080 0.453
Unemployed, looking for job -0.558 0.116 0.000
Unemployed, not looking -0.374 0.148 0.011
Permanently sick or disabled 0.085 0.139 0.540
Retired 0.168 0.067 0.012
Community or military service 0.258 0.279 0.355
Housework 0.051 0.066 0.439
Other -0.206 0.183 0.259
Other factors
Years in formal education -0.002 0.006 0.775
Intensity of religious belief 0.054 0.009 0.000
Belongs to discriminated group -0.538 0.091 0.000
Homeowner 0.102 0.044 0.021
Marginal eect of deviation from the median in values
Moderation 3.922 0.715 0.000
Inclusiveness 5.062 1.065 0.000
Model t statistics:
Prob > Chi Square (Wald) 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.061
+Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the regional level.
In other words, people who are more moderate or more inclusive than
their fellow citizens tend to dislike inequality more. Since we are discussing
moral traits, it is hard to put a strict quantitative interpretation on the
absolute values of regression coecients; but the deviations from national
medians in terms of moderation and inclusiveness have similar standard
deviations, respectively estimated at 0.38 and 0.35, and it is therefore rea-
18sonable to say that, for a given relative distance from the mainstream, in-
creases of inequality have an eect more or less twice as bad on those who
are distant because of moderation than on those who are distant because of
inclusiveness.
The result can be interpreted as follows: those who are more moderate
than their compatriots might dislike inequality because it acts as a trigger for
social tension, con
ict and unrest, as described by the literature referenced
in Section 1; those who are particularly inclusive might dislike inequality
because they perceive it as morally unfair. The former motive, known in
the literature as instrumental inequality aversion, appears to be stronger
than the latter, i.e. substantive inequality aversion.
Values also appear to be signicant when it comes to deriving happi-
ness from one's own income. The net eect of the logarithm of equivalent
income is positive, but turns negative when interacted with inclusiveness:
this may be an example of the guilt eect outlined in Section 2. The in-
teraction elements are not signicant when it comes to the impact exerted
on happiness by the general standard of living, as expressed by the national
median of equivalent incomes: the marginal eect is positive and signicant,
the interaction terms are not signicant. Finally, no comparative eects, as
measured by the eect of the regional median of equivalent income, emerge
from our model.
Moderation and inclusiveness in excess of the general reference level also
have a positive marginal impact on happiness, with coecients of 3.92 and
5.06 respectively. Where inclusiveness is concerned, this is consistent with
studies that show how higher levels of trust and of general openness towards
other people are associated with greater happiness. In the case of modera-
tion, the result might re
ect a comfortable distance from events, inducing
an ability to lter them into feelings in a more level-headed manner. The
intuition is particularly suitable to our sample, entirely composed of Euro-
pean countries where disastrous phenomena such as famine, epidemics, war
on domestic territory, and destruction wrought by extreme weather condi-
tions are virtually unknown. While a strong disposition towards moderation
might not be able to curb unhappiness from such occurrences, it can reduce
the impact of run-of-the-mill unpleasant happenings. This explanation is,
however, entirely speculative.
Finally, results on the set of controls are entirely aligned with previous
19literature. Among the circumstances positively associated with happiness
we nd good health, marriage or cohabitation, residence in a safe neighbour-
hood, intense religious belief, and the enjoyment of close friendships. On
the other hand, belonging to a discriminated group, having limited social
interaction, and living in a large city exert a negative impact.
We have so far looked at moderation and inclusiveness as separate di-
mensions. In the spirit of understanding whether the interaction of the
two might impact on happiness directly, and also as a manner of carry-
ing out sensitivity analysis, we estimated two further specications of our
regression: the rst is based on the simple consideration of the Cartesian
quadrants dened by the two orthogonal factors, the second is founded on
non-hierarchical k-means cluster analysis [Anderberg, 1973; Everitt, 1980].
Table A.5 shows that signicant inequality aversion is found in the two
high-moderation quadrants; high inclusiveness intensies the phenomenon
slightly, but it is not a requisite for its existence. The coecient for inter-
action between inequality and the high-inclusiveness, low-moderation quad-
rant dummy is not signicant, although it has the expected negative sign.
Cluster analysis reveals the presence of four clusters, described in Table
A.6. Regressions that include cluster dummies (Table A.7) give insights
similar to those presented above: signicant inequality aversion is found for
Cluster 2, which comprises people with high moderation scores, while a non-
signicant negative coecient is found for the highly inclusive individuals
in Cluster 4.
In general, when below-average moderation is accompanied by above-
average inclusiveness, the impact of the former appears to outweigh the
impact of the latter, consistently with the results presented above. It is also
possible that intra-class variability aects the estimates more when it comes
to inclusiveness than when it comes to moderation, notwithstanding simi-
lar distributions and independent of whether standardization procedures are
employed to neutralize outliers. This suggests that the eect of relative in-
clusiveness goes in the same direction but is both weaker and more markedly
non-linear than the eect of relative moderation.
As a further exercise of sensitivity analysis, we included country dum-
mies in the estimation of 2, to control for idiosyncratic eects; in order to
do that, we need to take out the national median of incomes, lest we incur
perfect collinearity. The results on inequality and values are stable, and
20only about half of the dummies are signicant. We favour the specication
that includes the national median of income because, although potentially
less comprehensive in meaning than a country dummy, it measures a dimen-
sion that is clearly understandable, and its eect can be easily estimated in
interaction with values.
6 Conclusions
This paper set out to understand whether it is possible to model the re-
lationship between inequality and happiness in a way that is consistently
appropriate across domains and takes into account both positional and in-
terpretational eects. We looked at the heterogeneity of values, inclinations
and beliefs as a possible unifying explanation for the existence of dierent
reactions to inequality.
Drawing on data for twenty-three countries from the second round of
the European Social Survey, carried out in 2004, we found that individual
views on a wide range of themes can be eectively summarized by two
orthogonal dimensions: moderation and inclusiveness. The former is dened
as a tendency to take mild stands on issues rather than extreme ones; the
latter is dened as the degree of support for a social model that grants equal
rights to everyone who willingly subscribes to a shared set of rules, regardless
of background and circumstances.
We ran a set of ordered logits where the degree of happiness on a 0-10
scale appears on the left-hand side, while distributive indicators interacted
with individual deviations from country medians in terms of moderation
and inclusiveness appear on the right-hand side, supplemented by a set of
standard controls. We chose to look at deviations from country medians
rather than raw levels in order to account for the fact that all the countries
in the sample are democracies, where redistributive policies are endogenous
with respect to values insofar as they capture, at least to some extent, the
opinions and desires of the representative voter.
Values turn out to matter when it comes to determining the sign and the
intensity of the relationship between inequality and happiness. In particu-
lar, individuals who are either more moderate or more inclusive than their
average compatriots tend to prefer lower levels of inequality. In the case
of moderation, inequality aversion can be read in terms of a desire for sta-
21bility: people who are reluctant to take strong stands probably also resent
social tension and unrest, which often accompany inequality. In the case of
inclusiveness, the main element at play is likely to be a negative reaction to
perceived unfairness. The eect of moderation appears to be stronger than
the eect of inclusiveness: instrumental inequality aversion is more frequent
and more intense than substantive inequality aversion.
Worldview eects appeared to be signicant also with reference to the
impact of personal income on happiness. The net eect of the logarithm
of own equivalent income is positive for all clusters, but it is remarkably
less intense, approximating zero, for people with a strong drive towards
inclusion.
The marginal eect of values was found to be positive and signicant for
those who exceed either average moderation or average inclusiveness. While
the result on inclusiveness is expected, on account of a well-known rela-
tionship between openness towards others, trust and happiness, the positive
sign on moderation was somewhat unanticipated. One possible explanation
may start with the observation that the sample only includes developed
countries, largely immune from disastrous phenomena such as widespread
extreme poverty or war on domestic territory. Most events that can be
perceived as unpleasant, barring health conditions that are controlled for
in our regressions, are probably minor; if moderation is associated with a
comfortable emotional distance from mundane disruptions, then it is bound
to have a positive impact on happiness.
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26A Appendix
Table A.1: Deleted observations and imputed incomes, by country
Country Starting
size
Deleted observations Imputed incomes
N Fraction N Fraction
Austria 2,256 654 0.29 627 0.28
Belgium 1,778 142 0.08 343 0.19
Czech Republic 3,026 1245 0.41 473 0.16
Denmark 1,487 239 0.16 127 0.09
Estonia 1,989 700 0.35 232 0.12
Finland 2,022 135 0.07 121 0.06
France+ 1,806 402 0.22 0 0.00
Germany 2,870 440 0.15 480 0.17
Greece 2,406 358 0.15 630 0.26
Hungary 1,498 345 0.23 131 0.09
Iceland 579 72 0.12 57 0.10
Ireland 2,286 483 0.21 379 0.17
Luxembourg 1,635 340 0.21 457 0.28
Netherlands 1,881 136 0.07 197 0.10
Norway 1,760 50 0.03 39 0.02
Poland 1,716 409 0.24 198 0.12
Portugal 2,052 426 0.21 678 0.33
Slovakia 1,512 490 0.32 325 0.21
Slovenia 1,442 290 0.20 208 0.14
Spain 1,663 342 0.21 446 0.27
Sweden 1,948 194 0.10 98 0.05
Switzerland 2,141 281 0.13 348 0.16
United Kingdom 1,897 142 0.07 337 0.18
Total 43,650 8,315 0.19 6,931 0.16
+ There are no imputed incomes for France on account of the unavailability of subjective
quality-of-life measures. All observations lacking income information were therefore deleted.
27Table A.2: Elementary value input for multiple correspondence analysis
Thematic
area ESS variable Question text
Response
scale
PPLTRST Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful? 11-point
Trust WRYTRDH How worried are you of being treated dishonestly? 4-point
BSNPRFT Businesses are only interested in making prots and not in improving service or quality (agreement) 5-point
CTZHLPO Citizens should spend at least some of their free time helping others (agreement) 5-point
Solidarity SCBEVTS Society would be better o it everyone just looked after themselves (agreement) 5-point
GINCDIF The government should take measures to reduce dierences in income levels (agreement) 5-point
SLCNFLW How wrong: someone selling something second-hand and concealing some or all of its faults? 4-point
Compliance
with law
PBOFVRW How wrong: a public ocial asking someone for a favour or bribe in return for their services? 4-point
CTZCHTX Citizens should not cheat on their taxes (agreement) 5-point
POLINTR How interested would you say you are in politics? 4-point
Civic
engagement
VOTE Did you vote in the last national election? YES/NO/NE
NWSPTOT On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do you spend reading newspapers? 8-point
WMCPWRK A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family (agreement) 5-point
Family and
gender roles
MNRSPHM Men should take as much responsibility as women for the home and children (agreement) 5-point
MNRGTJB When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than woman (agreement) 5-point
FREEHMS Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish (agreement) 5-point
Minorities IMWBCNT Is [cntry] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? 11-point
IMDFETN To what extend do you think [cntry] should allow people of a dierent race to come and live here? 11-point
2
8Table A.3: Item factor loadings and goodness-of-t statistics
Var Response Dim1 Dim2 Contr1 Contr2 Quality Mass Inertia
You can't be too careful -1.0472 -0.6244 0.0200 0.0082 0.0889 0.0030 0.0118
1 -0.7413 -0.6472 0.0069 0.0061 0.0371 0.0020 0.0120
2 -0.3746 -0.5753 0.0034 0.0093 0.0363 0.0040 0.0116
3 -0.0504 -0.4469 0.0001 0.0088 0.0258 0.0062 0.0111








5 0.0649 -0.0901 0.0003 0.0007 0.0118 0.0125 0.0097
6 0.3329 0.2008 0.0042 0.0018 0.0191 0.0062 0.0111
7 0.3465 0.4755 0.0059 0.0129 0.0585 0.0080 0.0107
8 0.1474 0.7028 0.0007 0.0187 0.0618 0.0053 0.0113
9 -0.0292 0.8783 0.0000 0.0063 0.0227 0.0012 0.0122
Most people can be trusted -0.5470 0.5488 0.0014 0.0016 0.0103 0.0007 0.0123
Not at all worried -0.0698 0.1976 0.0004 0.0041 0.0175 0.0148 0.0092








Fairly worried -0.1263 -0.2282 0.0011 0.0040 0.0179 0.0108 0.0101
Very worried -0.9168 -0.2029 0.0145 0.0008 0.0571 0.0028 0.0119
Disagree strongly -0.8050 0.5514 0.0035 0.0019 0.0159 0.0009 0.0123








Neither agree nor disagree 0.3516 0.1400 0.0077 0.0014 0.0692 0.0102 0.0102
Agree 0.2379 -0.1426 0.0084 0.0035 0.0668 0.0243 0.0070
Agree strongly -0.8574 -0.1037 0.0554 0.0009 0.2129 0.0123 0.0097
Disagree strongly -1.8246 -0.5613 0.0075 0.0008 0.0253 0.0004 0.0124








Neither agree nor disagree 0.2652 -0.0840 0.0046 0.0005 0.1277 0.0106 0.0101
Agree 0.2099 -0.0637 0.0089 0.0010 0.1152 0.0330 0.0051
Agree strongly -0.9893 0.4282 0.0525 0.0114 0.2289 0.0088 0.0105
Disagree strongly -0.4747 0.7168 0.0158 0.0418 0.2050 0.0115 0.0099








Neither agree nor disagree 0.1633 -0.3549 0.0013 0.0069 0.1202 0.0077 0.0108
Agree -0.1897 -0.6238 0.0017 0.0207 0.0690 0.0075 0.0108
Agree strongly -1.5097 -0.4811 0.0384 0.0045 0.1354 0.0028 0.0119
Disagree strongly -0.4795 0.4171 0.0022 0.0019 0.0143 0.0016 0.0122








Neither agree nor disagree 0.3859 0.0336 0.0078 0.0001 0.0657 0.0086 0.0106
Agree 0.2717 -0.1119 0.0106 0.0021 0.0670 0.0235 0.0072
Agree strongly -0.8008 0.0132 0.0575 0.0000 0.2306 0.0147 0.0092
Not wrong at all -1.2506 -0.7478 0.0056 0.0023 0.0694 0.0006 0.0124








Wrong 0.2431 -0.1340 0.0094 0.0033 0.0841 0.0260 0.0067
Seriously wrong -0.2266 0.2063 0.0079 0.0076 0.1817 0.0252 0.0068
Not wrong at all -0.9787 -0.6764 0.0032 0.0018 0.0791 0.0005 0.0124








Wrong 0.1646 -0.3626 0.0025 0.0139 0.0935 0.0149 0.0092
Seriously wrong -0.0536 0.1725 0.0007 0.0081 0.1818 0.0385 0.0038
Disagree strongly -1.0103 0.1576 0.0073 0.0002 0.0227 0.0012 0.0122








Neither agree nor disagree 0.1516 -0.0422 0.0010 0.0001 0.1012 0.0073 0.0108
Agree 0.3489 -0.1135 0.0220 0.0027 0.1696 0.0295 0.0059
Agree strongly -0.6997 0.2880 0.0420 0.0083 0.2119 0.0141 0.0093
Not at all interested -0.5556 -0.0617 0.0176 0.0240 0.1637 0.0093 0.0104








Quite interested 0.2306 0.2756 0.0065 0.0108 0.1059 0.0201 0.0080
Very interested -0.1455 0.7950 0.0008 0.0260 0.1193 0.0058 0.0112
No -0.2534 -0.4323 0.0044 0.0149 0.1104 0.0112 0.0100





Not eligible to vote 0.1353 0.1165 0.0005 0.0004 0.1148 0.0044 0.0115
29Table A.3: Item factor loadings and goodness-of-t statistics (cont.)
Var Response Dim1 Dim2 Contr1 Contr2 Quality Mass Inertia
No time at all -0.3160 -0.2320 0.0093 0.0058 0.0812 0.0152 0.0091
Less than 0.5 hour 0.0942 0.0590 0.0009 0.0004 0.0370 0.0174 0.0086
0.5 to 1 hr 0.1648 0.1330 0.0026 0.0020 0.0663 0.0158 0.0090








1.5 to 2 hr 0.0398 -0.0503 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 0.0016 0.0121
2 to 2.5 hr 0.1277 0.0559 0.0001 0.0000 0.0046 0.0006 0.0124
2.5 to 3 hr -0.1789 0.1822 0.0001 0.0001 0.0052 0.0003 0.0124
More than 3 hr -0.1673 0.0554 0.0001 0.0000 0.0047 0.0005 0.0124
Disagree strongly -0.8380 1.2236 0.0180 0.0445 0.2253 0.0042 0.0116








Neither agree nor disagree 0.3271 0.0005 0.0082 0.0000 0.0991 0.0125 0.0097
Agree 0.1859 -0.3655 0.0044 0.0196 0.1814 0.0207 0.0078
Agree strongly -1.2744 -0.3475 0.0615 0.0053 0.2263 0.0062 0.0111
Disagree strongly -1.6401 -0.6477 0.0070 0.0013 0.0242 0.0004 0.0124








Neither agree nor disagree 0.1796 -0.4752 0.0009 0.0071 0.0427 0.0044 0.0115
Agree 0.4558 -0.1885 0.0368 0.0073 0.2974 0.0290 0.0060
Agree strongly -0.6524 0.4855 0.0506 0.0326 0.3767 0.0195 0.0081
Disagree strongly -0.5052 1.0501 0.0179 0.0900 0.4080 0.0115 0.0099








Neither agree nor disagree 0.3018 -0.3207 0.0059 0.0077 0.0772 0.0106 0.0101
Agree 0.0171 -0.7548 0.0000 0.0426 0.1760 0.0106 0.0101
Agree strongly -1.5151 -0.7071 0.0614 0.0155 0.2503 0.0044 0.0115
Disagree strongly -1.2129 -0.7597 0.0284 0.0129 0.1406 0.0032 0.0118








Neither agree nor disagree 0.0906 -0.5395 0.0004 0.0153 0.0571 0.0074 0.0108
Agree 0.4130 -0.0809 0.0241 0.0011 0.1559 0.0231 0.0073
Agree strongly -0.3482 0.7124 0.0126 0.0613 0.3391 0.0170 0.0087
Country made worse -1.3786 -0.9029 0.0066 0.0134 0.0566 0.0023 0.0120
1 -0.6843 -0.9044 0.0304 0.0151 0.1353 0.0026 0.0119
2 -0.3571 -0.7839 0.0031 0.0175 0.0607 0.0040 0.0116
3 -0.0137 -0.5541 0.0000 0.0126 0.0401 0.0058 0.0112








5 0.1702 0.0958 0.0031 0.0011 0.0406 0.0173 0.0086
6 0.3740 0.2714 0.0049 0.0030 0.0247 0.0058 0.0112
7 0.2782 0.5574 0.0026 0.0119 0.0423 0.0054 0.0113
8 -0.0119 0.8448 0.0000 0.0204 0.0576 0.0040 0.0116
9 -0.2717 1.1180 0.0005 0.0101 0.0285 0.0011 0.0122
Country made better -0.8320 1.2718 0.0052 0.0141 0.0522 0.0012 0.0122
Allow none -0.8013 -0.9506 0.0284 0.0464 0.2337 0.0072 0.0109








Allow some 0.2946 0.2731 0.0120 0.0120 0.1135 0.0226 0.0074
Allow many -0.1737 1.0522 0.0012 0.0516 0.1540 0.0066 0.0110




Log own 0.175 0.031 0.000
Std interquartile range, regional 0.198 0.190 0.297
Log median, national 0.225 0.164 0.169
Log median, regional 0.095 0.136 0.484
Demographics
Gender: female 0.187 0.036 0.000
Age -0.070 0.007 0.000
Age squared 0.001 0.000 0.000
Self-reported health (baseline = very good)
Good -0.574 0.042 0.000
Fair -1.122 0.103 0.000
Bad -1.860 0.125 0.000
Very bad -2.527 0.366 0.000
Marital status (baseline = married or in registered cohabitation)
Separated -0.893 0.162 0.000
Divorced -0.581 0.053 0.000
Widowed -0.960 0.102 0.000
Never married -0.565 0.071 0.000
Children
Children living at home -0.052 0.058 0.372
Children living outside the home 0.146 0.028 0.000
Social ties
At least one close friend 0.622 0.060 0.000
Frequency of social activity 0.123 0.007 0.000
Location (baseline = city center)
Suburbs or outskirts of big city -0.021 0.052 0.688
Town or small city 0.016 0.073 0.828
Country village 0.048 0.070 0.494
Farm or home in countryside 0.179 0.095 0.059
Feeling of safety in own neighbourhood (baseline = very safe)
Safe -0.181 0.044 0.000
Unsafe -0.332 0.036 0.000
Very unsafe -0.472 0.144 0.001
Job status (baseline = employee)
Student 0.202 0.089 0.022
Unemployed, looking for job -0.584 0.125 0.000
Unemployed, not looking -0.442 0.143 0.002
Permanently sick or disabled 0.105 0.176 0.550
Retired 0.136 0.073 0.064
Community or military service 0.353 0.315 0.263
Housework 0.052 0.052 0.316
Other -0.108 0.211 0.609
Other factors
Years in formal education 0.017 0.009 0.047
Intensity of religious belief 0.051 0.009 0.000
Belongs to discriminated group -0.484 0.118 0.000
Homeowner 0.132 0.052 0.011
Model t statistics:
Prob > Chi Square (Wald) 0.000
Pseudo R
2 0.048
+Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the regional level




(baseline for interaction terms: SW Quadrant, Mod < median; Incl < median)
Log own 0.283 0.064 0.000
*NW Quadrant Mod < median; Incl > median -0.163 0.086 0.057
*NE Quadrant Mod > median; Incl > median -0.227 0.079 0.004
*SE Quadrant Mod > median; Incl < median -0.117 0.062 0.057
Std interquartile range, regional 0.740 0.279 0.008
*NW Quadrant -0.293 0.298 0.325
*NE Quadrant -0.883 0.307 0.004
*SE Quadrant -0.640 0.265 0.016
Log median, national 0.732 0.306 0.017
*NW Quadrant -0.417 0.348 0.230
*NE Quadrant -0.302 0.282 0.284
*SE Quadrant -0.310 0.277 0.264
Log median, regional -0.278 0.324 0.391
*NW Quadrant 0.300 0.394 0.446
*NE Quadrant 0.097 0.295 0.742
*SE Quadrant -0.160 0.278 0.566
Demographics
Gender: female 0.134 0.037 0.000
Age -0.062 0.009 0.000
Age squared 0.006 0.000 0.000
Self-reported health (baseline = very good)
Good -0.583 0.052 0.000
Fair -1.077 0.075 0.000
Bad -1.784 0.115 0.000
Very bad -2.420 0.336 0.000
Marital status (baseline = married or in registered cohabitation)
Separated -0.932 0.146 0.000
Divorced -0.624 0.072 0.000
Widowed -0.924 0.077 0.000
Never married -0.631 0.049 0.000
Children
Children living at home -0.067 0.048 0.169
Children living outside the home 0.144 0.051 0.004
Social ties
At least one close friend 0.606 0.080 0.000
Frequency of social activity 0.162 0.017 0.000
Location (baseline = city center)
Suburbs or outskirts of big city -0.008 0.075 0.912
Town or small city 0.051 0.061 0.408
Country village 0.103 0.062 0.096
Farm or home in countryside 0.249 0.107 0.020
Feeling of safety in own neighbourhood (baseline = very safe)
Safe -0.107 0.045 0.016
Unsafe -0.217 0.062 0.001
Very unsafe -0.364 0.113 0.001
Job status
Student 0.099 0.078 0.204
Unemployed, looking for job -0.561 0.114 0.000
Unemployed, not looking -0.380 0.148 0.010
Permanently sick or disabled 0.085 0.140 0.610
Retired 0.159 0.066 0.015
Community or military service 0.295 0.266 0.268
Housework 0.042 0.064 0.512
Other -0.193 0.179 0.279




Years in formal education 0.004 0.006 0.424
Intensity of religious belief 0.054 0.009 0.000
Belongs to discriminated group -0.516 0.090 0.000
Homeowner 0.094 0.044 0.034
Marginal eect of deviation from the median in values
(baseline = SW Quadrant)
NW Quadrant 3.349 0.849 0.000
NE Quadrant 5.200 0.701 0.000
SE Quadrant 3.116 0.849 0.000
Model t statistics:
Prob > Chi Square (Wald) 0.000
Pseudo R
2 0.059
+ Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the regional level.
Table A.6: Cluster means, standard deviations and descriptions
Cluster N
Deviation from country median:
Description Moderation Inclusiveness
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
1 12,500 -0.268 0.335 -0.032 0.205 - Mod (weak)
2 11,484 0.360 0.137 -0.076 0.191 ++ Mod
3 4,332 -0.110 0.342 -0.540 0.144 - Mod (weak), { Incl
4 7,019 -0.062 0.296 0.511 0.209 ++ Incl
Table A.7: Ordered logit estimates for happiness: clusters
Estimate Std Err
+ Pr>ChiSq
Equivalent income (baseline for interaction terms = Cluster 1 Mod < median)
Log own 0.219 0.049 0.000
*Cluster 2 Mod > median -0.068 0.057 0.238
*Cluster 3 Mod < median (weak); Incl < median -0.058 0.075 0.436
*Cluster 4 Incl > median -0.156 0.075 0.039
Std interquartile range, regional 0.584 0.201 0.004
*Cluster 2 -0.734 0.197 0.000
*Cluster 3 0.261 0.336 0.439
*Cluster 4 -0.652 0.289 0.024
Log median, national 0.504 0.221 0.023
*Cluster 2 -0.017 0.213 0.935
*Cluster 3 0.213 0.447 0.633
*Cluster 4 -0.344 0.296 0.246
Log median, regional -0.140 0.214 0.512
*Cluster 2 -0.063 0.210 0.763
*Cluster 3 -0.078 0.465 0.866
*Cluster 4 0.195 0.281 0.487
Demographics
Gender: female 0.132 0.037 0.000
Age -0.063 0.009 0.000
Age squared 0.001 0.000 0.000
33Table A.7: Ordered logit estimates for happiness: clusters (cont.)
Estimate Std Err
+ Pr>ChiSq
Self-reported health (baseline = very good)
Good -0.579 0.052 0.000
Fair -1.070 0.074 0.000
Bad -1.755 0.114 0.000
Very bad -2.447 0.339 0.000
Marital status (baseline = married or in registered cohabitation)
Separated -0.936 0.151 0.000
Divorced -0.617 0.071 0.000
Widowed -0.923 0.075 0.000
Never married -0.634 0.048 0.000
Children
Children living at home -0.061 0.048 0.196
Children living outside the home 0.143 0.051 0.005
Social ties
At least one close friend 0.615 0.080 0.000
Frequency of social activity 0.162 0.017 0.000
Location (baseline = city center)
Suburbs or outskirts of big city -0.018 0.074 0.806
*no a qui Town or small city 0.045 0.062 0.463
Country village 0.093 0.063 0.143
Farm or home in countryside 0.244 0.109 0.025
Feeling of safety in own neighbourhood (baseline = very safe)
Safe -0.114 0.043 0.008
Unsafe -0.224 0.061 0.000
Very unsafe -0.375 0.112 0.001
Job status
Student 0.096 0.080 0.228
Unemployed, looking for job -0.555 0.114 0.000
Unemployed, not looking -0.407 0.146 0.005
Permanently sick or disabled 0.086 0.143 0.548
Retired 0.154 0.066 0.020
Community or military service 0.259 0.284 0.361
Housework 0.033 0.066 0.610
Other -0.194 0.182 0.287
Other factors
Years in formal education 0.006 0.006 0.298
Intensity of religious belief 0.053 0.009 0.000
Belongs to discriminated group -0.514 0.093 0.000
Homeowner 0.097 0.045 0.030
Marginal eect of deviation from the median in values (baseline = Cluster 1)
Cluster 2 1.934 0.542 0.000
Cluster 3 -1.393 1.068 0.192
Cluster 4 3.662 0.823 0.000
Model t statistics:
Prob > Chi Square (Wald) 0.000
Pseudo R
2 0.059
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